

Severe airport sanitarian control could slow down the spreading of COVID-19 pandemics in Brazil

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Background. We investigated a likely scenario of COVID-19 spreading in Brazil through the complex airport network of the country, for the 90 days after the first national occurrence of the disease. After the confirmation of the first imported cases, the lack of a proper airport entrance control resulted in the infection spreading in a manner directly proportional to the amount of flights reaching each city, following first occurrence of the virus coming from abroad. **Methodology.** We developed a SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model divided in a metapopulation structure, where cities with airports were demes connected by the number of flights. Subsequently, we further explored the role of Manaus airport for a rapid entrance of the pandemic into indigenous territories situated in remote places of the Amazon region. **Results.** The expansion of the SARS-CoV-2 virus between cities was fast, directly proportional to the airport closeness centrality within the Brazilian air transportation network. There was a clear pattern in the expansion of the pandemic, with a stiff exponential expansion of cases for all cities. The more an airport showed closeness centrality, the greater was its vulnerability to SARS-CoV-2. **Conclusions.** We discussed the weak pandemic control performance of Brazil in comparison with other tropical, developing countries, namely India and Nigeria. Finally, we proposed measures for containing virus spreading taking into consideration the scenario of high poverty.

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1 **Abstract**

2 **Background.** We investigated a likely scenario of COVID-19 spreading in Brazil
3 through the complex airport network of the country, for the 90 days after the first
4 national occurrence of the disease. After the confirmation of the first imported cases, the
5 lack of a proper airport entrance control resulted in the infection spreading in a manner
6 directly proportional to the amount of flights reaching each city, following first
7 occurrence of the virus coming from abroad.

8 **Methodology.** We developed a SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model divided in
9 a metapopulation structure, where cities with airports were demes connected by the
10 number of flights. Subsequently, we further explored the role of Manaus airport for a
11 rapid entrance of the pandemic into indigenous territories situated in remote places of
12 the Amazon region.

13 **Results.** The expansion of the SARS-CoV-2 virus between cities was fast, directly
14 proportional to the airport closeness centrality within the Brazilian air transportation
15 network. There was a clear pattern in the expansion of the pandemic, with a stiff
16 exponential expansion of cases for all cities. The more an airport showed closeness
17 centrality, the greater was its vulnerability to SARS-CoV-2.

18 **Conclusions.** We discussed the weak pandemic control performance of Brazil in
19 comparison with other tropical, developing countries, namely India and Nigeria. Finally,
20 we proposed measures for containing virus spreading taking into consideration the
21 scenario of high poverty.

22 **Key-words** – SARS-Cov-2 pandemic; SIR model; metapopulation dynamics; Amazonia;
23 Indigenous people; one-Ecohealth.

24

25 **Introduction**

26 In the last few weeks, the new disease COVID-19 has been spreading rapidly around
27 the world mainly due to stealth transmission, which started in China at the end of 2019.
28 Large continental countries are likely to be very vulnerable to the occurrence of
29 pandemics (Morse et al. 2012). While the dissemination dynamics have varied between
30 regions, country sanitary policies play a key role in it. For instance, two very large
31 developing countries, India and Brazil, have a very different epidemical pattern. On
32 March 18th, India had 137 cases and Brazil 621, as recorded in the Brazilian Ministry of
33 Health and John Hopkins monitoring sites dedicated to SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19.
34 From 17th to 18th March, Brazil had an increase of 31% in one day, with only four
35 capitals exhibiting community transmission, which was the same to India. However, a
36 very distinct pattern in the ascending starting point for the reported disease exponential
37 curve was observed in each country. By enlarging the comparison to another
38 developing tropical country in the Southern Hemisphere (thus in the same season), we

39 selected Nigeria, since it was the first country to detect a COVID-19 case in Africa.
40 Nigeria displayed less than 10 confirmed cases during the same period of time.
41 Furthermore, Nigeria has a population (206 million) similar to that of Brazil (209 million).

42 Both India and Nigeria claim they imposed severe entrance control, and close
43 following up of each confirmed case, as well as their living and working area, and
44 people in contact with them. In Brazil, the Ministry of Health has developed a good
45 monitoring network and a comprehensive preparation of the health system for the worst-
46 case scenario. Nonetheless, apparently, the decisions from the Ministry of Health did
47 not cover airport control, and only on March 19th, eventually too late, the government
48 decided to control the airports, avoiding the entrance of people coming from Europe or
49 Asia. Hence, the entrance of diseased people in Brazil has been occurring with no
50 control, at least until the aforementioned date. Moreover, after confirming that a person
51 is infected with SARS-CoV-2, his/her monitoring is initiated but there is no monitoring of
52 his/her living network.

53 For pandemic situations, such as that with which we are living with SARS-CoV-2,
54 the classical algebraic ecological models of species population growth from Verhulst,
55 and species interaction models from Lotka-Volterra, are theoretical frameworks capable
56 to describe the phenomenon and to propose actions to stop it (Pianka 2000). In many
57 aspects social isolation is a way to severely reduce carrying capacity, i.e., the resources
58 available for the virus dissemination. This is the best action for within-city pandemic
59 spreading of coronavirus (Hellewell et al. 2020), since the main form of transmission is
60 direct contact between people or by contact with fomite, mainly in closed environments,
61 such as classrooms, offices, etc. (Rothe et al., 2019; Bedford et al., 2020). Regardless
62 of virulence, for a highly contagious virus such as SARS-CoV-2, the occurrence of the
63 first case in a nation will result in a strongly and nearly uncontrollable exponential
64 growth curve, depending only on the number of encounters between infected and
65 susceptible people, and fuelled by a high H_0 (the number of people one infected person
66 will infect).

67 On the other hand, the dynamics of disease spreading among cities are entirely
68 distinct. In this work, we present an epidemiological model describing the free entrance
69 of people coming from two highly infected countries with close links to Brazil: Italy and
70 Spain. We showed how SARS-CoV-2 spreads into the Brazilian cities by the
71 international airports, and then to other, less internationally connected cities, through
72 the Brazilian airport network. For exploring the dynamics of a continent size, nationwide
73 spreading of SARS-CoV-2, as it is the case of Brazil, we assumed cities connected by
74 airports formed a metapopulation structure.

75 Each person in a city was taken as a component of a superorganism, i.e., an
76 interdependent entity where living individuals are not biologically independent between
77 them in various subtle ways. By doing so, we dealt with cities as the sampling units, not
78 the people. Flights coming from foreign countries with COVID-19 (namely Spain and

79 Italy for this article) represent the probability of an external invasion of infection in each
80 city. Additionally, we also further explored the vulnerability of the Amazon region,
81 especially of those remote towns where indigenous and traditional communities
82 predominate.

83

84 **Materials & Methods**

85 In order to describe the pattern of air transportation and its role in the spreading of the
86 disease, we built a SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model (Hethcote 1989;
87 Anderson 1991) split amongst the cities that are interconnected by flights. In this model,
88 the population size inside each city is irrelevant, as well as when the collective infection
89 stage was reached. Thus, we assumed that the city was fully infected and became
90 infectious to the whole system, and, therefore, became a source and not a sink of
91 infection events. Hence, the SIR model started having cities with only susceptible
92 events. Infected events only appeared by migration, i.e. travelers only from Italy and
93 Spain, for sake of simplicity and proximity to the facts.

94 After the first occurrence is registered in the country, infected events started to
95 spread through the national airlines.

96 We used a modified version of the SIR model, which took into account the
97 topology of how the cities-demes were linked by domestic flights. In the SIR original
98 model, the infection of susceptible cities occurs by probability β of a healthy being (S)
99 encounters an infected one (I). Conversely, the model has a probability of an infected
100 one get recovered (R) given by a parameter γ . Analytically:

101

$$102 \quad S_{t+1} = S_t - \frac{\beta}{N} S_t I_t$$

103

$$104 \quad I_{t+1} = I_t + \frac{\beta}{N} S_t I_t - \gamma I_t$$

105

$$106 \quad R_{t+1} = R_t + \gamma I_t$$

107

108 where the indexes t and $t+1$ represent the present time and the next time, respectively,
109 and $N=S+I+R$ is the total constant population. In this work, we proposed two
110 modifications of the SIR model. The first one is related to the fact that we considered all
111 Brazilian cities that have an airport. Thus, we had S^i , I^i , and R^i where i was a given city.
112 In our case study, $1 \leq i \leq 154$. Another important modification was that related to the
113 connections among airports or cities. Using ANAC data, it was possible to track all the
114 domestic flights in Brazil (Figure 1): <https://www.anac.gov.br/assuntos/dados-e-estatisticas/historico-de-voos>

115

116

118 The modified version of SIR model is then described as follows:

119

$$120 \quad S_{t+1}^i = S_t^i - \frac{\beta}{N} S_t^i (I_t^i + \bar{I}_t^i)$$

121

$$122 \quad I_{t+1}^i = I_t^i + \frac{\beta}{N} S_t^i (I_t^i + \bar{I}_t^i) - \gamma (I_t^i + \bar{I}_t^i)$$

123

$$124 \quad R_{t+1}^i = R_t^i + \gamma (I_t^i + \bar{I}_t^i),$$

125

126 where the upper index i indicates the city, and t the time. The term \bar{I}_t^i represents the

127 infection added to the i^{th} city due to traveling diseases, and it is calculated as follow:

128

$$129 \quad \bar{I}_t^i = \alpha \sum_{j=0}^{154} k_{i,j} I_j$$

130

131 where k_{ij} is the number of flights departing at city i and arriving at city j , and α is a newly
132 introduced parameter, which represents the fraction of traveling infected population. For
133 the time, we estimated 90 days for the disease expansion and assumed γ as 0, in other
134 words, no recovery. Despite the artificiality of this assumption, we considered that the
135 amount of people still to be infected is larger than those recovered and, thus, becoming
136 resistant, which makes the resistance irrelevant to our output. The model was
137 developed in C and is available as Supplementary Material 1 (and the database as
138 Supplementary Material 2). In addition, we also used a linear model to test whether
139 those cities with higher airport closeness centrality (i.e., important cities for connecting
140 different cities within the Brazilian air transportation network) were more vulnerable to
141 SARS-CoV-2 dissemination.

142

143 **Results**

144 The expansion of the SARS-CoV-2 virus between cities was fast, directly proportional to
145 the airport closeness centrality within the Brazilian air transportation network. The
146 disease spread from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to the next node-city by the flight
147 network, and in 90 days virtually all the cities with airport(s) were reached, although it
148 occurred with a distinct intensity (Figure 2, Supplementary Material 3). There was a
149 clear pattern in the expansion of the pandemic, with a stiff exponential expansion of
150 cases (measured as the cumulative percentage of infected people per city) for all the
151 cities. On average, the model showed an ascendant curve starting at day 50 (around 15
152 April), with the most connected cities starting their ascendant curve just after 25 days,
153 and the most isolated ones from day 75 (10th May; Figure 3A). Looking at the daily

154 increment rates, it is clear a first and high peak of infections in the hub cities, happening
155 around 50 days and, starting from 75 days, a new peripheric peak (Figure 3B).

156 The first ten cities to ascend infection rates (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador,
157 Recife, Brasília, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Curitiba, and Florianópolis) will
158 actually reach this point about the same time, which is a concerning pattern for the
159 saturation of the public health services. Also, this peak in those cities will saturate all the
160 best hospitals in the country simultaneously.

161 Therefore, we defined the average proportion of infected people for the 90 days
162 as a measure of vulnerability to COVID-19 dissemination. Henceforth, we found that
163 more an airport shows closeness centrality within the air transportation network, the
164 greater was its vulnerability to disease transmission (Figure 4). This scenario confirmed
165 the importance of a city connecting different cities within the Brazilian air transportation
166 network and, thus, acting as the main driver for the pandemic spreading across the
167 country.

168

169 *Consequences for the Amazonian cities and indigenous people*

170 Herein we showed that an uncontrolled complex airport system made a whole
171 country vulnerable in few weeks, allowing the virus to reach the most distant and remote
172 places, in the most pessimistic scenario. According to our model, any connected city will
173 be infected after three months. As the number of flights arriving in a city is the driver for
174 the proportion of infected people, Manaus, which is a relevant regional clustering, was
175 infected sooner. Indeed, on the 17th of March, Manaus was the first Amazonian city with
176 confirmed cases (without community transmission yet), and it is a node that is one or
177 two steps to all the Amazonian cities. Thus, according to our model, Manaus may reach
178 1% of the infected population by the 44th day, while, for instance, the far west
179 Amazonian Tabatinga will take 61 days to reach the same 1% of the population
180 infected. By day 60, Manaus may have an average of 50% of its population infected if
181 nothing is be done to prevent it. Tabatinga may also reach the aforementioned value by
182 day 78, if nothing is be done to avoid it. To sum up, within 46 days all the Amazonian
183 cities will have 1% of their population infected and a mean of 50% by day 70.

184

185 **Discussion**

186 Brazil has failed to contain COVID-19 in airports and failed to closely monitor those
187 infected people coming from abroad, as well as their living network. One main reason
188 for this is the difficult logistics required to produce such control in a continental country,
189 such as Brazil, which has a complex national flight network. According to the Brazilian
190 Airport Authority, Brazil has the second-largest flight network in the world (just after the
191 USA), with a total of 154 airports registered to commercial flights of which 31 are
192 considered international. In comparison, airport control may be much easier to set up in
193 Nigeria (31 airports of which only five are international). However, with a population 6.4

194 times higher than Brazil, India, in turn, has a similar sized airport network to Brazil,
195 harboring a total of 123 airports of which 34 are considered international.

196 Nevertheless, the situation of COVID-19 in India is currently much milder than in
197 Brazil, and it is hard to blame the complexity of the airport networks for the contrasting
198 exponential curve of these two countries. In 20 days from the first infection in Brazil
199 (February 26th) against 47 days after the first Indian case (January 30th), Brazil already
200 had 5.4 more confirmed cases than India. Clearly one country is doing much better in
201 preventing the entrance of cases and the spreading of the disease by controlling
202 infected citizens. Considering the high probability of a synchronizing SARS-Cov-2 high
203 spreading in various capitals, the country may face a quick health service collapse.

204 Besides the within-city pattern of virus spreading, one must take into account the
205 pattern of dispersion between cities after the virus has invaded. Additionally, for the
206 Brazilian case, one cannot ignore that, eventually, the occurrence of the first case may
207 have occurred nearly one month before official records, during the carnival period. This
208 is the largest popular street party on the planet, with 6.4 million people in Rio de
209 Janeiro, and 16.3 million in Salvador where the Brazilian Ministry of Tourism revealed
210 that 86,000 foreigners from France, Germany, Spain, Italy, UK, and the US had visited.
211 Considering a disease with so many asymptomatic cases, it could have invaded before
212 but, with the lack of an early warning and airport control, one will never know exactly if
213 this happened. As airport control might have been even more lax in small airports, it
214 might unavoidably result in strengthening of the capability of an infected city to infect the
215 next new one, if no public policy is adopted.

216 Without a social isolation policy, virus propagation may result in chaotic
217 dynamics, *sensu* May (1976). The lack of control for these situations may result in a
218 dramatic rate of host infection, and an eventual collapse of the host-parasite interaction
219 in a given population, depending on the amount of susceptible, infected and recovered
220 events. Nonetheless, if the population is split into deme-cities, in a metapopulation
221 structure, the collapse takes longer, and a much greater amount of people in different
222 locations may eventually be infected, as found in our model. It is worthwhile to mention
223 that this model, already pessimistic, did not consider the road network, one of the
224 largest on the planet. Most importantly, the best road-connected cities are exactly those
225 mostly connected by airport, and that will be vulnerable earlier, thus, probably spreading
226 the disease faster than our model can predict, unless roads are soon blocked for
227 people. Another weakness of the model is that it cannot quantify a great number of
228 small airports not registered for commercial flights, very common in the Amazonian and
229 Western regions. Taking this into a global scale, for a highly interconnected human
230 population, the consequences may be catastrophic, as it was for the influenza pandemic
231 (Spanish flu) in 1918 (Ferguson et al. 2003). Furthermore, one aspect that must not be
232 neglected is the way as an increasing number of infected people in a city drive the
233 pandemic towards the next city or country. In this context, the complex and large flight

234 network of Brazil, which is also key for the whole Latin America, if not properly
235 monitored and controlled, may cause a window of opportunity for the virus to spread
236 over the entire continent.

237 The consequences of this uncontrolled SARS-Cov-2 spreading is particularly
238 serious if one takes into consideration the chances of a mutant virulent strain appearing
239 and spreading into poorer and little monitored places of the world. Specifically, for the
240 Amazon region, the lack of any control will make the city of Manaus a very sensitive
241 cluster for public health, due to predominantly poor and indigenous-dominated cities in
242 the region, which are connected to Manaus and will be rapidly infected. Reaching
243 isolated regions means reaching indigenous or traditional communities, whose
244 individuals are classically more susceptible to new pathogens than western-influenced
245 or mixed urban populations. Therefore, a way to prevent such spreading, if still there is
246 time, would be to deal with airports as entrances that need severe infection barriers.

247

248 **Conclusions**

249 The eventual lesson to take is that inflexible, severe, and easy to repeat
250 controlling protocols must be applied to all the cities with airports. Likewise, the follow-
251 up monitoring of suspicious individuals and their living network should be reinforced as
252 a national strategy to prevent a large territory to be taken over by a pandemic in a short
253 period of time. In other words, internationally accepted procedures must be taken and
254 even be reviewed to adjust to complex national flight networks of any country. Such
255 procedures must be considered as a priority for national remote airports too, in order to
256 keep poorer and worse equipped cities away from a rapid spread of a pandemic
257 disease.

258 It is clear at this point that a fast spread of the SARS-CoV-2 is a reality in Brazil,
259 and across most of the country. We proposed this model in order to emphasize the
260 fragility of Brazilian surveillance in the airport network, in an attempt to cause some
261 policy change in time to preserve at least the most remote regions, which are also the
262 most vulnerable, with a weaker health service. Moreover, most of the Eastern part of the
263 country must stay in social isolation in order to prevent a health public collapse by mid-
264 April, as the Ministry of Health predicted. In addition, we also could consider the
265 generalized poverty of Brazil as a further problem our model did not deal with. The
266 chances to produce home-to-home isolation, even legally imposed, is impossible for
267 these poor communities. Nonetheless, considering the few main entrances of most of
268 the Brazilian shanty towns and communities, a similar to airport entrance severe control
269 must be considered to protect a larger but closely connected set of people, eventually
270 following the protocols used for control of Ebola during the last epidemic in Africa (Lau
271 et al. 2017).

272

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314 Figure 1 – Brazilian flight network, taken from ANAC database.

315

316 Figure 2 – Proportion of infected population of each Brazilian city in 40, 50, 70, and 90
317 days. Circle colour temperature represents a gradient in percentage of the infected
318 population. Circle size also reflects the size of the pandemics locally in the logarithm
319 scale.

320

321 Figure 3 – Proportion of infected people per cities until 90 days. A) Cumulative increment
322 rate. The blue line is the national average, and the shadow area is the summing up of
323 minimum and maximum values of all the cities per time interval; B) Daily increment rate.
324 The blue line is the average, showing the overall high rate of infection occurring from 50
325 to 80 days. Shadow shows the first and the highest peak in the hub cities, around 50
326 days, and, subsequently, a peripheric peak after 75 days.

327

328 Figure 4 – Airport closeness centrality within the Brazilian air transportation network,
329 and its effect on the vulnerability of each city (represented by the average of the
330 percentage of cases per city for the whole 90 days running: $r^2 = 0.71$ $p < 0.00001$).

331

332 Supplementary Material 1 – Code description - SIR model under network topology.

333 The code was developed in C, and it works as a modification of SIR model running along with
334 the topology of the domestic flight network. After initiating all variables to an initial condition, that
335 is, S (health), I (infected) and R (recovered) of each city, the code starts loading the network
336 and calculates the total number of flights among all the cities. This information is used to feed
337 the classical SIR model introducing in the variable I, the information regarding infected travelers
338 and non-travelers, and the model calculates the next S, I and R of all the cities. This calculation
339 is done in a loop time representing days, the time step that the model was calibrated.

340

341 Supplementary Material 2 – ANAC database of aerial transportation network.

342 The spreadsheet presents all the 120 cities with airport(s), their state, latitude and
343 longitude, followed by the closeness centrality in the network. The columns t0 to t90 are
344 the times from 0 to 90 days. Lines for the time columns are the percentage of infected
345 people per city per time.

346

347 Supplementary Material 3 – Movie of the spreading of SARS-CoV-2.

348 This file has a short movie describing the dynamics of SARS-Cov-2 dissemination
349 across Brazil, in two versions.

350

Figure 1






Figure 2


Initial reports of COVID-19 in Brazil




Day 60



Vulnerability to COVID-19



Day 75



Day 90




Figure 3





Figure 4

